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Abstract
Previous theoretical researches show that learning from good performers yields intense
competition and results in the low pro¯tability of ¯rms. These researchers do not take into
account di®erentiation strategies being referred as a useful strategic tool to mitigate com-
petition. We introduce an evolutionary (learning) game into a duopoly model with product
di®erentiation on the Hotelling line. We ¯nd that central agglomeration appears in the
unique stochastically stable state in which the equilibrium price is equal to the marginal cost
of ¯rms. This implies that perfectly competitive equilibrium appears even when ¯rms have
an opportunity to di®erentiate themselves through product di®erentiation and to mitigate
competition.
JEL classi¯cation: C73, D41, D43, R32
Key words: product positioning, two dimensional choice, Walrasian, evolutionally stable,
spatial agglomeration.
¤Corresponding author: Tetsuo Yamamori, Gunma National College of Technology, 580, Toriba, Maebashi,
Gunma, 371-8530, Japan phone: +81-27-254-9100, fax: +81-27-254-9022, email:yamamori@gen.gunma-ct.ac.jp
1
1 Introduction
Learning from good performers seems to be a reasonable strategy to improve performance in
many situations. For instance, ¯rms often adopt a "me-too" strategy by following market lead-
ers. In the literature of evolutionary learning, however, this \me-too" strategy often leads to
low performance under strategic environments. For instance, Vega-Redondo (1997) investigates
a Cournot model where ¯rms learn through the imitation of success and shows that Walrasian
equilibrium appears in the unique stochastically stable state.1 That is, each ¯rm equates its
marginal cost to the market price (price taking behavior) in the stable state. This outcome,
obviously, means that each ¯rm's performance is low from the viewpoint of pro¯tability. To
escape this kind of ¯erce competition, we need to note that product di®erentiation is an impor-
tant strategic tool of ¯rms.2 When ¯rms can choose their product positions endogenously, are
they able to di®erentiate their products by the imitation of success? We show that the answer
is \No".
In this paper, we introduce an evolutionary game into an endogenous product di®erentiation
model where ¯rms compete in terms of price and product position on the Hotelling line. We
adopt the idea of Vega-Redondo (1997) and investigate the stochastically stable state in the
dynamic stochastic framework. We ¯nd that central agglomeration (no product di®erentiation)
appears in the unique stochastically stable state. At the equilibrium, the price is equal to the
marginal cost of ¯rms. The competitive equilibrium appears in the long run even when ¯rms
1 Starting with the analysis of Vega-Redondo (1997), evolution dynamics have been applied to Cournot
oligopolies (Schenk-Hopp¶e (2000), Al¶os-Ferrer (2004), Al¶os-Ferrer and Ania (2005), Schipper (2009)); Bertrand
oligopolies (Al¶os-Ferrer et al. (2000), Hehenkamp (2002), Ania (2008)); and di®erentiated product oligopolies
(Tanaka (2000, 2001) and Tasn¶adi (2006)).
2 Since the seminal work of Hotelling (1929), the spatial model has become one of the most important methods
of analyzing product di®erentiation. For instance, d'Aspremont et al. (1979) formulate a two-stage location-price
game on the Hotelling line. They show that the products are maximally di®erentiated under quadratic transport
costs. As a result, the equilibrium prices exceed marginal costs; this is unlike in a perfectly competitive equilibrium.
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have an opportunity to di®erentiate themselves through product di®erentiation and to relax the
competition. This is quite di®erent from the results in the literature on spatial models with
price competition. Some researchers have already attempted to explain central agglomeration.
de Palma et al. (1985) show that su±cient heterogeneity between ¯rms induces central agglom-
eration. Price collusion after ¯rms have made location choices is considered in Friedman and
Thisse (1993) and Jehiel (1992). Cooperation between ¯rms is considered in the form of infor-
mation exchange through communication by Mai and Peng (1999). In all works, the equilibrium
outcomes are not Walrasian.
Our result strengthens the result of Vega-Redondo (1997). As mentioned above, he inves-
tigates a quantity competition in homogeneous product markets and shows that the Walrasian
equilibrium appears in the unique stochastically stable state where each ¯rm equates its marginal
cost with the market price (price taking behavior). This result is in sharp contrast to the Cournot
limit theorem since his result holds true as long as the number of ¯rms is equal or more than two.
However, his result depends on the assumption of homogeneous product markets. If products
are di®erentiated, the equilibrium prices exceed marginal costs. Our result indicates that his
result is quite robust and his basic principle is applicable to broader situations. Firms dare not
di®erentiate their products in the unique stable state.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 formulates the model. Section
3 presents the main result. Section 4 includes the concluding remarks.
2 The Model
2.1 Location and Price Competition
Consider a model of di®erentiation on the Hotelling (1929) line. A linear city of length 1 lies
on the abscissa of a line, and consumers are uniformly distributed with density 1 along this
interval. There are two ¯rms, and each of them locates at some point in the city and sells the
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same physical product. When a consumer moves a distance d to buy the product, he/she incurs
a transportation cost t(d). We assume that t(d) is continuous, strictly increasing, and strictly
convex.3 Each consumer buys one unit if and only if the minimum generalized price (price plus
transportation cost) for the two ¯rms does not exceed u, the reservation value of the product.
Two ¯rms compete in terms of their locations and prices. Each ¯rm chooses its price from
a common countable set P = f±; 2±; :::; v±g, where ± > 0 and v is a positive integer. To simplify
the analysis, we assume that u¡t(1=2) > v±. Firm 1 locates at a point in the left-side of the city
and ¯rm 2 locates at a point in the right-side of the city. Each ¯rm chooses how far it locates
from the center of the city. The set of locations of each ¯rm is given as A = f0; 1=n; 2=n; :::; 1g,
where n is a positive integer. When ¯rm 1 (¯rm 2) chooses action a1 (a2)2 A, it is located at
(1¡ a1)=2 ((1 + a2)=2). A strategy si of ¯rm i identi¯es its price and location. Both ¯rms have
the same strategy set S = A£ P .
Given a strategy pro¯le (s1; s2) = ((a1; p1); (a2; p2)) where ai 6= 0 for some i, let x(s1; s2) be
a real number satisfying
p1 + t
µ¯¯¯¯
1
2
(1¡ a1)¡ x(s1; s2)
¯¯¯¯¶
= p2 + t
µ¯¯¯¯
1
2
(1 + a2)¡ x(s1; s2)
¯¯¯¯¶
:
If 0 · x(s1; s2) · 1, it is the location of the consumer who is indi®erent as to from where he/she
buys the product. For a strategy pro¯le (s1; s2) = ((a1; p1); (a2; p2)) where ai 6= 0 for some i,
the demand X1(s1; s2) for ¯rm 1 is given by
X1(s1; s2) =
8<:
0 if x(s1; s2) < 0
x(s1; s2) if 0 · x(s1; s2) · 1
1 if 1 < x(s1; s2)
For a strategy pro¯le (s1; s2) = ((a1; p1); (a2; p2)) where a1 = a2 = 0, the demand for ¯rm 1 is
3 The assumption of convexity of the transport cost is just for simplicity. Our theorem holds even without
this assumption.
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given by
X1(s1; s2) =
8<:
0 if p1 > p2
1=2 if p1 = p2
1 if p1 < p2
The demand X2(s1; s2) for ¯rm 2 is given by (1¡X1(s1; s2)). The payo®s of the ¯rms 1 and 2
are given by ¼1(s1; s2) = p1X1(s1; s2) and ¼2(s1; s2) = p2X2(s1; s2), respectively.
Lemma 1. Given a strategy pro¯le (s1; s2) = ((a1; p1); (a2; p2)),
(i) if p1 = p2 and aj > ai, then ¼i(s1; s2) > ¼j(s1; s2),
(ii) if pj > pi and a1 = a2 = 0, then ¼i(s1; s2) > ¼j(s1; s2).
Hotelling has already shown a result similar to Lemma 1(i). If both ¯rms name the same
price, the ¯rm closer to the central point obtains a larger market share, which results in higher
pro¯ts for that ¯rm. Lemma 1(ii) discusses the case with no product di®erentiation. Without
product di®erentiation, the ¯rm naming a higher price obtains zero market share, which results
in zero pro¯ts.
2.2 Imitation Dynamics
Evolutionary dynamics are taken to proceed in discrete time, which is indexed by t = 0; 1; 2; :::.
At each t, the state of the system may be identi¯ed using st = (st1; s
t
2) = ((a
t
1; p
t
1); (a
t
2; p
t
2)).
Thus, the state space of the system is the set of strategy pro¯les £ = S2. Associated to any
such st, the induced pro¯t ¼t = (¼t1; ¼
t
2) is de¯ned by ¼
t
i = ¼i(s
t) for each i. At every time t,
each ¯rm is assumed to enjoy a common and independent probability r > 0 of being able to
revise its former strategy. When ¯rm i revises its strategy, it imitates ¯rm j's strategy if the
payo®s of j are higher than those of i. Otherwise, it continues with its earlier strategy.4 This
4 Our results hold true even if the revision probabilities of location and price are di®erent as long as the revision
occurs at the same time with a positive probability.
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imitation process de¯nes a Markov process T0 = fT0(s; s0)gs;s02£ on the state space £, where
T0(s; s0) is a transition probability from s to s0.
A nonempty set Q µ £ is absorbing if T0(s; s0) = 0 for all s 2 Q and s0 62 Q, and no proper
subset of Q has this property. The basin of attraction of an absorbing set Q is the set of states
from which there exists a positive probability that the imitation process moves the system to Q
in ¯nite time.
It is evident that any state s where ¼i = ¼j constitutes a singleton absorbing set. Note that
if ¼i > ¼j , the event that ¯rm j imitates ¯rm i occurs with a positive probability. Thus, from
any state with ¼i 6= ¼j , there exists a positive probability that the imitation process moves the
system to a singleton absorbing set in which the two ¯rms have the same payo®s.
Lemma 2. (i) For any state s such that ¼i(s) 6= ¼j(s), there exists an absorbing set fµg,
whose basin of attraction contains s.
(ii) It follows from (i) that any absorbing set is a singleton in which the payo®s of the two
¯rms are the same.
Hereafter, an absorbing set is referred to as an absorbing state.
2.3 Mutations
At the end of each period t, the price and location of each ¯rm mutate by a common independent
probability ² > 0. In this event, all of the prices or all of the locations are chosen with a positive
probability. Note that the probability of mutating both price and location of a ¯rm is ²2. It
is crucial for this paper that two or more mutations are required for a price and location to
change simultaneously. An interpretation of this mutation process is as follows. There are two
managers in each ¯rm: a pricing manager who decides the ¯rm's price and a location manager
who decides the ¯rm's location. With a small probability, each manager experiments with new
choices or is replaced by a new manager.
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The imitation process with mutations de¯nes a Markov process T² = fT²(s; s0)gs;s02£ on
the state space £, where T²(s; s0) is a probability that the combination of the imitation and
mutation processes moves the system from s to s0. Note that T²(s; s0) > 0 for all s; s0 2 £.
Since all elements in T² are strictly positive, T² is irreducible and aperiodic. Therefore, T²
has the following properties:5 (i) there exists a unique stationary distribution ¹¤² satisfying
¹¤²T² = ¹¤² ; (ii) the system converges to ¹¤² from any initial condition; (iii) in any su±ciently
lengthy time period, the cumulative relative frequency of the time the system spends on each
state is approximately given by ¹¤² ; (iv) the limiting distribution, lim²!0 ¹¤² , exists.
A state in support of the limiting distribution is known as a stochastically stable state in
Young (1993). When the mutation rate is small, the system spends most of the time in stochas-
tically stable states.
3 Results
3.1 Existing results
In order to investigate stochastically stable states, we rely on the mutation-counting arguments
employed by Kandori et al. (1993) and Young (1993). For each s 2 £, a s-tree h is a binary
relation on £ such that (i) for every state s0 2 £ n fsg, there exists one and only one transition
of the form (s0 ! s00); (ii) from every state s0 2 £ n fsg, there exists a sequence of the form
(s0 ! k1); (k1 ! k2); : : : ; (kl ! s); (iii) there exists no transition of the form (s! s0).
The cost Ã(s; s0) of the transition of the form (s ! s0) is de¯ned by the least number of
mutations required to move the system from s to s0. Note that for any absorbing state µ,
Ã(µ; s) ¸ 1 for any s 2 £ n fµg, since it takes at least one mutation to move from any absorbing
state. On the other hand, for any non-absorbing state s, there is an absorbing state µ with
Ã(s; µ) = 0.
5 See Freidlin and Wentzel (1984).
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The cost of a tree h is given by
P
(s!s0)2h Ã(s; s
0). It is well known that state s is a stochas-
tically stable state if and only if the minimum cost among all s-trees is also the minimum among
all states in £. We now claim the following lemma without proof.
Lemma 3. State s¤ is a stochastically stable state if and only if
s¤ 2 argmin
s2£
0@min
h2Hs
X
(s!s0)2h
Ã(s; s0)
1A ;
where Hs is the set of s-trees.
It is easy to see that s¤ is a stochastically stable state only if it is an absorbing state.
3.2 Stochastically stable state
Let µ¤ = ((a¤1; p¤1); (a¤2; p¤2)) be an absorbing state, where a¤1 = a¤2 = 0 and p¤1 = p¤2 = ±. The
following lemma implies that µ¤ is a stochastically stable state.
Lemma 4. There exists a µ¤-tree h whose cost is exactly ¸ ¡ 1, where ¸ is the number of
absorbing states.
Proof. Consider a µ¤-tree h that satis¯es the following conditions. (1) For any absorbing state
µ = (s1; s2) with s1 6= s2, h contains the transition of the form (µ ! µ0), where µ0 = ((a; p); (a; p))
and Ã(µ; µ0) = 1. (2) For any absorbing state µ = ((a; p); (a; p)) with a 6= 0, h contains (µ ! µ0),
where µ0 = ((0; p); (0; p)). (3) For any absorbing state µ = ((0; p); (0; p)) with p 6= ±, h contains
(µ ! µ¤). (4) For any non-absorbing state s, h contains (s! µ) such that s 2 B(µ).
Note that in any absorbing state µ = (s1; s2) with s1 6= s2, ¼1(s1; s2) = ¼2(s1; s2) by Lemma 2
(ii). Note also that the payo®s of two ¯rms will di®er if at least one mutation occurs. Therefore,
by Lemma 2 (i), there exists an absorbing state µ0 = ((a; p); (a; p)) with Ã(µ; µ0) = 1. Thus, we
can construct a tree h that satis¯es condition (1). Furthermore, it follows from Lemma 1 that
the cost of each transition that appeared in the conditions (2) and (3) is 1. Therefore, the cost
of the above tree is exactly ¸¡ 1.
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Lemma 5. For any absorbing state µ 6= µ¤, the cost of any µ-tree h is larger than ¸¡ 1.
Proof. We show that more than one mutation is required for going from µ¤ to any other absorbing
state. Consider a state s = ((a¤1; p01); (a¤2; p¤2)), where p01 6= p¤1. Since p01 > p¤2 = ±, ¼2(s) > ¼1(s)
by Lemma 1 (ii). Therefore, from state s, the imitation process without mutations converges
to µ¤. Next, consider a state s = ((a01; p¤1); (a¤2; p¤2)), where a01 6= a¤1. Since a01 > a¤2 = 0,
¼2(s) > ¼1(s) by Lemma 1 (i). Therefore, from state s, the imitation process without mutations
converges to µ¤. Similarly, the imitation process without mutations converges to µ¤ from any
state where either the price or the location of ¯rm 2 is not µ¤.
Note that the assumption that either a price or a location changes in one mutation is crucial
for this Lemma. If a price and a location change simultaneously with probability ², only one
mutation may move the system from µ¤ to another absorbing state.
Lemmata 4 and 5 imply that µ¤ is a unique stochastically stable state. Thus, we have the
following theorem.
Theorem . There exists a unique stochastically stable state µ¤ = ((a¤1; p¤1); (a¤2; p¤2)), where
a¤1 = a¤2 = 0 and p¤1 = p¤2 = ±.
We now explain the intuition behind the result. In the long run, ¯rms name the same
price through the imitation process. Given the common price, the ¯rm located closer to the
central point obtains larger pro¯ts (Lemma 1(i)). Thus, through the imitation process, the
¯rms agglomerate at the central point.
4 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we investigate evolutional dynamics in an endogenous product di®erentiation
model. Firms compete in terms of price and location on the Hotelling line. We adopt the idea of
Vega-Redondo (1997) and investigate the stochastically stable state in the dynamic stochastic
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framework. We ¯nd that ¯rms produce homogeneous products in the unique stochastically
stable state. The competitive equilibrium appears in the long-run even when ¯rms have an
opportunity to relax the competition through product di®erentiation.
We adopted the standard assumption of the Hotelling model that each consumer consumes
one unit of product. However, our result does not depend on this assumption. Even if we
introduce the model of Anderson and de Palma (2000) with elastic demand for each consumer,
our result still holds true.
Our result is very closely related to the discussions on the relative payo® approach.6 If the
¯rms care more about their relative pro¯ts, ¯rms have an incentive to choose smaller product
di®erentiation. Investigating the relationship between the relative pro¯t approach and evolu-
tionary dynamics in more general contexts remains for the future.
6 One of the most fundamental assumptions in economics is that ¯rms maximize absolute pro¯ts. However,
already Alchian (1950) suggested that ¯rms may maximize relative pro¯ts in the long run rather than absolute
pro¯ts.
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